not affect the standard tax incidence results for the model considered here.4
When the output market clears, factors are paid their wages, and the after-tax earnings are then distributed to shareholders in proportion to their holdings.
Finally, it is assumed that all commitments to factor inputs are met and that there is no risk of default on the bond obligations.5 Letting p(a) denote the price of output in the first sector expressed in terms of the price in the second sector, the after-tax earnings 17((a) of the corporate sector may be expressed as
H17(a) = (1 -t) [p()xF1(K1, L1) -rB1 -wL,]
= (1 -t) [p(cc)ccL1f1(k1) -L1(r1k1 + w)], where t is the corporate income tax rate. The tax system is assumed to be such that the corporate tax involves full loss offset. The earnings of the noncorporate sector are given by
(1) H2 = F2(K2, L2) -r2B 2 =L2 f2(k2)-L2(r2k2 + w).
Adopting the view of Harberger [p. 215] that the corporation income tax is one [1973] and King [1975] have shown.
2.2. Consumers. At the beginning of the period, consumers are assumed to make portfolio decisions and to allocate their labor and capital to firms, while at the end of the period they purchase commodities using their factor payments plus their share of the profits distributed by firms. At the end of the period consumer i's consumption problem, conditional on a, is maximize Ui(Cf, C )
where Ui(Ct, Ci) is an ordinal, concave utility function for the two commodities and Ii(ca) is the income of consumer i when ao? is the realization of X.6
Consumer i is assumed to be initially endowed with fixed amounts of labor Li and capital Ki which may be hired by firms at prices w and r, respectively.
Each consumer i is also endowed with a portfolio consisting of ownership shares, yi, of the corporate sector firms. A consumer may sell his shares in the securities market at the market price V1 and may purchase new shares yi and bonds bi.
Since the noncorporate sector does not include publicly-traded firms, it is assumed that consumers receive a fixed share, 7i, of their profits.7 8 Thus, income available for consumption is given by (4) Ii(a) =Yv71i) + yI72 + rbi + wLi.
Each consumer is assumed to have a subjective probability assessment of a which may be represented by the absolutely continuous, distribution function which is assumed to be strictly concave in Ii(a), and Ei denotes the expectation operator.9 2.3. Security and Factor Market Equilibrium. It is assumed that firms act 6 The reformulation given in this section is based on that given in Helpman and Razin and used in Baron and Forsythe [1979] . The optimal consumption is a function of p(a) and 1P(a) and hence indirectly a function of a.
I If the noncorporate sector is viewed as being composed of institutions such as mutual companies or mutual savings associations, trading in ownership shares could be considered.
Similarly, if farms are included in that sector, consumers could purchase or sell acreage or enter into sharecropping arrangements.
in the best interest of their shareholders and in this model it can be shown that shareholders unanimously prefer that the firm maximizes its market value. Since uncertainty enters linearly into the returns of firms in the corporate sector, it is easy to show that the random component of the return, p(a)a, can be obtained by (1 -t)Llfl(kl) and (12 = -t)Ljf,(k,)F12
Given this spanning property, the "price," p*/r, of the random component p(oc)xo of the return is the market certainty equivalent of the random variable p(oc)cx discounted to the beginning of the period. Due to the multiplicative natu of uncertainty, the market certainty equivalent may be determined directly from the market value of the corporate sector firm, the inputs, and the factor prices.'0
By assuming that the input decisions of one firm have a negligible effect on the availability of inputs of other firms and that all consumers perceive that the profit and market value of a given firm is independent of the decisions of any other firm, it may be shown that all shareholders prefer that firms in the corporate sector maximize their market value" given by (6) V1 -r -t)p*Llfl(kl) 1[(I -t)w + rk1]}.
The preferred input levels for firms maximize the values V, a
and 0 The price p*/r is given by r r = r(Vi+k1Lj)+(I-t)wL, r(Lj f1(k1) (1-t))
11 These conditions are derived by maximizing the consumer's expected utility at a securities market equilibrium. The derivation will not be presented here, since analogous conditions are derived in Baron and Forsythe [1979] .
12 As Milne [1976, 1979] has shown, the reduction of the asset economy to one in which (i) consumers solve the portfolio problem in (5) (ii) corporate firms maximize their market value in (6) (iii) noncorporate firms maximize their profits in (1), is isomorphic to a certainty economy in which the price is p*.
(10) f2(k2) -W -rk2 = 0-An equilibrium in factor markets requires that the returns to factors be the same in both sectors, so (11) p*(l -t)f (kl) =f2 (k2) and (12) p*(fi(kl) -klf(kl)) = f2(k2) -k2(k2).
At an equilibrium resources are fully employed, so The equilibrium in this model is thus charact (11)- (14) and (18) 
where the denominator is negative due to the strict concavity of the indirect utility function. To sign the numerator, we know from (8), that wL1 = p*Lljf(kl)_ rk(L_ so that (19) may be written as
The first term in (20) is negative and thus if the second terms is nonpositive, each individual's demand for units of output one decreases with increases in the tax rate. Using the method of Arrow [1971, p. 119] it can be shown that if an individual's measure of absolute risk aversion is nondecreasing then (21) Eul I(p(c)c _ p*)2-and thus, from (20), individual demand for z{ will vary inversely with the tax rate.
However, Arrow also has shown that the expression in (21) is individual i's income effect with regard to changes in the risky output z4, and so the assumption of nondecreasing absolute risk aversion implies that the risky output is an inferior good. Thus, with decreasing absolute risk aversion it must be the case that income effects are small in order to obtain the desired result that dzi/dt<O. Further, it should be noted that this result is stronger than required since, in fact, what we wish to assume is that _ D(p*, tl(qi)) = E dzt <o at dt
In the case of a direct tax effect, the market clearing condition may be written as (11)- (14). As shown in Baron and Forsythe [1981] an increase in the corporate income tax increases the wage paid to labor and decreases the return to capital. This result is qualitatively the same as Harberger who assumes that there is no direct tax effect and that the equilibrium is evaluated at t=O.
DISCUSSION
Batra and Ratti and -Shome find that when firms maximize the expected utility of profits, the results of Harberger and Mieszkowski fail to obtain. For example, Batra concludes that Harberger's principal result turns on the behavior of firm's relative and absolute risk aversion, since the factor returns in his model are dependent upon the utility functions and probability assessments of firms. If the securities of a firm are traded and production is subject to multiplicative uncertainty, the securities market establishes a certainty equivalent price that firms can use in planning their inputs in a manner directly analogous to that in a deterministic model. Using Harberger's assumptions, the certainty equivalent price separates production decisions from a consumer's consumption-portfolio decisions, so the reduced form of the model analyzed here is isomorphic to a certainty economy. In fact, the system of equations, (11)- (14) and (18), are identical to those analyzed by Harberger, and hence, the results he obtains under certainty also hold under uncertainty.'5 Contrary to Batra's conclusion, if the corporate sector is capital intensive relative to the noncorporate sector, then in proportion to its share of national income capital will bear a greater burden of the corporate income tax than labor. Furthermore, the analysis of partial-factor taxes also is straightforward in this model and, with the methodology developed here, Mieszkowski's results can be shown to extend to this stochastic economy.
Studies of firm behavior under-uncertainty that represent the objectives of firms in terms of the preferences and expectations of a decision maker, either an entrepreneur or a manager, will necessarily conclude that those preferences and expectations influence production decisions unless a market is present that prices out the uncertainty in the model.'6 The tax incidence results of Batra and Ratti and Shome are thus applicable to firms owned and operated by a single entrepreneur but not to publicly-traded firms that are managed in the interests of their
shareholders. An alternative justification for the expected utility maximization objective of a firm is that it is descriptive of managerial decision-making when ownership is separated from the control of a firm. Even in the case of a manager who maximizes an arbitrary expected utility function, however, Baron and Forsythe have shown that separation obtains if the firm trades its own shares through treasury purchases. The conclusions of deterministic theory are then applicable.
-To argue that uncertainty compromises the results of deterministic theory in a model in which the uncertainty enters in a linear manner thus requires rather special
